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Prior to 1994, South Africa was infamous for its racialised policies and seemingly 
limitless measures of social control through a regime of apartheid, or racialised 
separation. Its unforgiving approach of previous, white-minority governments 
extended to mainly black foreigners, including refugees from the civil war in 
Mozambique from 1977–1992. After democratic elections in 1994, South 
Africa’s immediate post-apartheid migration regime was still largely oriented 
around an unreconstructed, apartheid-era approach of controlling the admission 
into, residence in, and departure from South Africa.  
This dire situation triggered a call for reform, to which policymakers were very 
slow to respond. Ultimately, in its efforts to develop and implement a border 
management and migration framework, the South African government has 
heavily relied on legal frameworks, border control policies, strategies and 
technologies transplanted from Europe and the United States. But, despite all 
this investment in a precedent-based yet foreign machinery, the government still 
struggles with its porous borders and irregular immigration. 
As a result, attempts to manage migration through policy reforms in South 
Africa have been fraught with challenges and contradictions. Particularly from 
around 2008, South Africa has not only embraced a spate of ever-more 
restrictive policies and laws that aim to sift out the desirable from the undesirable 
migrants, it has defied court judgements that have found the government to be 
in contravention of the law and the Constitution and obliged it to change. This 
has culminated in an explicitly deterrent and security-oriented approach that 
continues to lack effective judicial oversight. 
In this Working Paper, we present a comprehensive overview of South African 
migration and Border Control policies over a 25-year period. In a separate paper, 
which builds on this thick description, we argue that South Africa’s efforts to 
deter immigrants has not been framed by globally-accepted principles, based on 
South Africa’s ratification of international treaties governing refugees and 
migrants in particular, but rather has continued to be a policy of rather arbitrary 
enforcement is a sad reflection of deep-seated governance problems that the 
country faces generally. 
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Border enforcement policies and reforms in South 
Africa (1994-2020)1 
1 Introduction 
This working paper presents a thick description of migration and border control 
polices in South Africa from a period of transition and political negotiations in 
the early 1990s, culminating in the country’s first democratic elections in 1994, 
up until 2019. 
 
During the 1980s, very large numbers of unrecognised Mozambican refugees 
fleeing civil war were the most notable feature of the migration landscape, 
though their entry and residence was hardly regulated at all, and they also did 
not feature in official statistics (Dolan 1995 and 1998). This notwithstanding, 
actual numbers of migrants entering South Africa, particularly from 
neighbouring Zimbabwe and Mozambique during the 1990s, have been heavily 
contested, ranging from conservative estimates of several hundred thousand, to 
heavily exaggerated figures ranging into the ‘millions’ (Kotzé and Hill 1997: 21). 
Such claims were reinforced by what late 1990s scholars fiercely critiqued as 
‘pseudo-scientific’ data and in particular the absence of reliable statistics (Crush, 
1997). What was clear, however, was that the general character of regionally-
based migration had been ‘circular’, with most migrants engaging in small-scale 
trading, and expressing little wish to remain permanently (Crush 1999: 128). 
 
But, despite the reality of migrants making a positive economic contribution 
through mainly circular migration, popular perceptions were that there was a 
flood of foreigners, reinforced by brazen newspaper headlines such as ‘Kick 
Them Out!’ (The Citizen 1997; Danso and McDonald 2001). 
 
Post-apartheid South Africa was experiencing a wave of migration, both 
regulated and extra-legal (Seda 2015). However, this was not at the level 
portrayed by the media and the small number of researchers paying attention to 
the issue. By 1994, neighbouring Mozambique was regarded as having achieved 
a degree of political stability since the maintaining of a Peace Accord in 1992, 
although the country was beset with a crippling economy that – like its support 
for anti-government rebels during the civil war – South Africa had contributed 
to undermining (Matonse 1992: 31). Moreover, environmental disasters 
generated new waves of forced migrants, including devastating floods that 
displaced hundreds of thousands in 2000 (Christie and Hanlon 2001). 
 
 
1 Elements of this Working Paper were previously contained in Handmaker and Singh 
(2002) ‘Crossing Borders: A comparison of US and South African Border Control 




As we highlight in this chapter, the South African government’s attempts to 
manage migration through policy reforms have been fraught with challenges and 
contradictions. In embracing a liberal democracy, the South African government 
undertook to respect constitutional and international obligations that widely 
recognized the rights of everyone in South Africa, as well as its regional 
commitments to free movement within Southern Africa and Africa generally 
(SADC 2005). However, in practice, it has fallen far short of these commitments 
(Ntlama 2018: 40). 
 
In presenting an overview of migration policy developments between 1994 and 
2018, it is worth mentioning that Handmaker worked as a legal advocate and 
researcher on migration policy, norms and practices as a legal practitioner in 
South Africa from the 1990s to the early 2000s and so much of what is contained 
in this review is based on direct observations, while Nalule’s work as a researcher 
in South Africa has focussed on subsequent reforms to South Africa’s migration 
laws and policies.  
 
In section two, we highlight the pre-democratic context in which South Africa’s 
border control policies emerged, prior to successive phases of policy reforms. In 
sections three and four, we explain the first phase of these reforms, namely 
rudimentary asylum procedures and the transplantation of US-styled policy 
approaches to immigration and border control. This was followed by a more 
concerted effort at policy reforms took place over a twenty-year period, from 
1998 until 2018, in three separate phases. 
 
This working paper is a descriptive backdrop to a subsequent article that we are 
writing that explains how South Africa’s efforts to deter immigrants has not been 
framed by globally-accepted principles, based on South Africa’s ratification of 
international treaties governing refugees and migrants, but rather has been a 
policy of arbitrary enforcement that has been ‘deployed in everyday legal 
governance’ (Valverde 2005: 55). 
8 
 
2   A turbulent history 
The history of migration policies and border control practices in South Africa 
has been turbulent, including after the country gained political independence 
with democratic elections in 1994. Throughout the pre-1994 period of racialized 
apartheid up until the coming into force of a Refugees Act in 2000, border 
controls and migration policies in South Africa were effected through rigid 
external measures (at the border) and arbitrary internal measures (primarily in 
urban areas). The profiling of undocumented migrants on the basis of racialised 
criteria led to a number of persons being apprehended and taken into detention 
when they possessed a valid visa or permit to reside (SAHRC 1999, Handmaker 
and Parsley 2001).  
 
Prior to 1994, South Africa was infamous for its seemingly limitless measures of 
social control through a regime of apartheid, or racialised separation. These 
racialised policies and measures extended to how South Africa controlled 
migrants at its borders (Handmaker and Singh 2002). Despite much external 
pressure, from the United Nations in particular which was continually denied 
the opportunity to establish a presence in South Africa despite large-scale flows 
of Mozambicans from the civil war, the government was stubbornly resistant to 
change. Instead, South Africa reinforced its control through police and security 
forces that were ‘always in the front line in the enforcement of apartheid … 
(and) ensured that black South Africans were kept in their places in segregated 
and inferior institutions’ (Cawthra 1993: 1). 
 
This unforgiving and racialised approach of previous, white-minority 
governments extended to mainly black foreigners, including refugees from the 
civil war in Mozambique from 1977 – 1992, who braved a collection of horrors, 
including dangerous wild animals in Kruger National Park (which borders both 
countries) and a fence generating a lethal electric voltage, in their desperation to 
avoid border control officials and reach relative safety in neighbouring South 
Africa (HRW 1998: 67). 
 
South Africa’s immediate post-apartheid migration regime was still largely 
oriented around an unreconstructed, apartheid-era approach of controlling the 
admission into, residence in, and departure from South Africa. Described as 
‘apartheid’s last act’, the ominously named Alien’s Control Act of 1991 
transmitted most aspects of the apartheid migration and border control regime 
into the post-1994 regime in South Africa (Crush 1996; Peberdy and Crush: 
2001). And reforms did not come quickly, buttressed by the nativist views of 
scholars at the time (Minaar and Hough 1996). For example, it was maintained 
that while ‘South Africa clearly has a responsibility to assist with the 
development of the region, this will have to be carefully defined and weighed 




These ‘domestic exigencies’ meant that from long-before democratic elections 
in 1994, until the Immigration Act came into force in 2002, gaining access to 
South Africa’s territory was maintained through a ‘two gates’ system, namely the 
ominously-titled Aliens Control Act and various bi-lateral treaties between South 
Africa and neighbouring countries concerning temporary migrant workers 
(Crush 1997). 
 
In the early years of South Africa’s post-apartheid migration and border control 
policies, coinciding with legal and political transition from minority-led 
authoritarianism to a liberal democracy, the South African Police Service (SAPS) 
was primarily responsible for enforcing internal controls, a situation that led to 
a number of allegations of corruption and abuse of power (Pretoria News 1998). 
Just as it did during the period of apartheid, the SAPS played the most substantial 
enforcement role in comparison with other key border enforcement agencies 
terms of manpower, enforcing internal control measures (detecting, 
apprehending, and detaining suspected undocumented migrants) and manning 
several of the land border posts. This included the Lebombo border post, one 
of the most important land border-crossings, known as the Maputo corridor, 
where high levels of bribery have been reported, although migrants (mostly 
small-scale entrepreneurs) report to have otherwise been treated favourably 
(Peberdy and Crush 2001: 121). In addition to regulating the movement of 
persons, the police have also been responsible for detecting illegal smuggling of 
goods and prohibited items (drugs, weapons, etc.) and, together with Customs, 
regulating the transport of legal goods. 
 
Meanwhile, the second key border enforcement agency, the Department of 
Home Affairs (DHA) has been primarily responsible for policy-making, 
controlling the entry and exit of people through the borders, including more 
complicated determinations on residential status (temporary permits and 
permanent residence permits) and refugee status. As Belvedere (2007) has 
argued, the immigration function of the DHA, and particularly asylum 
management, has always been in tension with its civic services function, which 
includes the registration of births and deaths, issuance of National IDs, 
passports, among others. 
 
Finally, the function of the third key border enforcement agency, the South 
Africa National Defence Forces (SANDF) has broadly been to secure South 
Africa’s borders. This role has been especially contested given the violent border 
conflicts of the 1980s. As we discuss later in section 4, after some hesitation 
from 1994 until the late 2000s, the role of the military substantially increased 
from around 2010. 
 
Once South Africa held its first democratic elections, caught up in the euphoria 
of the new-found democracy and embracing a rights-based constitutional order 
and a concurrent commitment to international human rights norms, the 
importance of immigration policy reform became glaring. The apartheid-era 
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Aliens Control Act had evolved only marginally, from a punitive regime based 
on racialised exclusion, to a punitive regime based on racialised deterrence. 1995 
amendments to the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 had eliminated some of the 
more extreme measures, such as ouster clauses that made it impossible to 
judicially-challenge a decision of an immigration officer (Klaaren 1996; Klaaren 
and Ramji 2001; Handmaker 1999: 294). But this didn’t go nearly far enough. 
 
As we discuss in the next section, attention to bringing the country’s migration 
and border control policies in line with human rights was initially focussed on 
the asylum system through ad hoc, rudimentary measures and culminating in a 
Refugees Act that was passed in 1998. 
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3   Rudimentary asylum procedures (1994–2002) 
A rudimentary refugee policy in South Africa was initially framed by the broader, 
restrictive migration policy framework of the Aliens Control Act. Following 
democratic elections in 1994, South Africa was under increasing pressure, not 
least internationally, to produce a more progressive regime on migration 
generally, with the refugee policy initially receiving greater priority. In the 
absence of a solid legislative basis, from 1991 until April 2000 when the Refugees 
Act came into force, the South African government formally regarded asylum 
seekers as exceptions within the framework of the Aliens Control Act.  
 
It was initially required by this policy that one lodge their asylum request at the 
border. From the early 1990s, officials were trained by UNHCR to recognise 
potential asylum applicants. Later on, provisions were put in place for refugee 
status determination based on internal departmental circulars and a Basic 
Agreement signed between the Government of South African and the UNHCR 
(Handmaker 1999). Implementation, however, had its fair share of problems, 
particularly regarding the wide discretion afforded to immigration and border 
control officials to take decisions on refugee status, with limited to no managerial 
or judicial oversight (Handmaker 1999: 294-299). 
 
Following a well-organised lobby on the part of NGOs, a Refugees Act was 
passed at the end of 1998. However, expectations of a more progressive 
approach towards refugees were quickly diminished. Regulations, which did not 
come until two years afterwards in April 2000, made clear that the South African 
government intended to severely limit access to refugee protection through 
restrictive interpretations and to reduce the reception conditions of asylum 
seekers in a bid to discourage migration more generally. This was 
notwithstanding the fact that persons genuinely fleeing persecution would have 
had little, if any, means to survive on their own, and that those intending to enter 
on non-Refugee Convention grounds would have been no less discouraged, 
since their intention was simply to gain entry to South Africa in the first place. 
Further, proposed amendments to the Act would have had the effect of diluting 
the rights contained in the Refugees Act even further (Klaaren, de la Hunt and 
Handmaker 2008; Handmaker 2001). 
 
Among many concerns that NGOs had, the fundamental principle of 
international refugee law that an asylum seeker ought not be punished for 
his/her illegal manner of entry (e.g. for having transited via a country perceived 
to be ‘safe’) was routinely violated. South African NGO Lawyers for Human 
Rights successfully challenged the government’s ‘safe country’ policy in 2000 
(Handmaker 2001: 104). However, enforcement of this decision, like many other 
judgements, proved to be very difficult. The DHA has persistently defied these 
court judgements (Landau and Amit 2014). Hence, in 2011, LHR was compelled 
to challenge the policy again (LHR and CoRMSA 2011: 5-6). 
12 
 
An even great concern that NGOs have had concerns the South African 
government’s general tendency towards blanket refusal of entry, or non-entrée 
(de la Hunt 2000). This has been reinforced by restrictive entry requirements, a 
limited capacity on the part of NGOs to provide legal assistance and long 
distances between the borders and refugee determination processing centres. All 
in all, it has been extremely challenging for asylum seekers to gain access to 
asylum determination procedures in South Africa, let alone be afforded due 
process or receive basic social services (Handmaker, de la Hunt and Klaaren 
2001 and 2008). 
 
Following the 1998 Refugees Act, which came into force in April 2000, the 
South African government then turned its attention to the management of 
border controls, which as explained in the next section, has involved a great deal 
of policy transplantation from the USA. 
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4   Transplantation of  US-styled policies 
While polices regarding refugees proceeded in a relatively progressive fashion, 
general policies on immigration and border control were motivated largely by 
security concerns that were echoes of the previous regime (Crush and Tshitereke 
2001). It soon transpired that this lurch towards securitization was due to 
extensive involvement of the US government and reliance on advisors seeking 
to transplant security-oriented United States (US) migration policy and border 
control mechanisms.  
 
The US had taken a major interest in South Africa’s policy development since at 
least 1996/97, when it sent over a team of border control officials to review 
South Africa’s air, land and seaports. Later, the US established an office in 
Johannesburg, joining officials of the United Kingdom who had been 
investigating cargo operations in Durban (Sunday Independent 1997). Following 
their review of border crossings in South Africa, US government officials made 
recommendations, conducted training of South African officials and eventually 
even participated in government task teams developing policy. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that border management systems in the US at the time 
that were being transplanted to South Africa had not only consistently failed to 
achieve their stated objectives but had raised a number of serious human rights 
concerns as well (HRW 1995 and 1997). 
 
In 1997, a report by an Inspection Team from the US Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service (INS) was released, ‘pursuant to a request from the South 
African Government to the United States Department of State’ (US INS 1997: 
2). According to the report, which was accompanied by a report by the US 
Customs (1997), the request was in relation to the South African Government’s 
efforts ‘to assist that government combat the growing crime problem’ (US INS 
1997: 2). The INS Inspection Team, which was composed of border control and 
inspections officials from various sea, air and land border posts in the United 
States, was split into four teams, making assessments of selected land borders, 
seaports and airports in South Africa. Its aim was (in part) to ‘provide a working 
methodology by which other problems can be identified and attacked’ (Ibid: 12). 
The report strongly encouraged the South African government to prioritise 
‘control of illegal immigration (as) one of its top priorities’ (Ibid: 4) 
 
The US INS Report also made a nebulous recommendation that ‘the 
community’ be more involved in border policing, based on an unsubstantiated 
claim that ‘the community has a vested interest in border control’ (Ibid: 7). 
Emphasis was also placed in the US INS Report on holding train, ship and airline 
companies accountable for border control, through a comprehensive system of 
fines, based on a contention that this would be a ‘force multiplier to border 
control’ (Ibid: 8). Moreover, the report claimed that ‘numerous intelligence 
documents, both national and international, had concluded that the illegal alien 
situation in South Africa (was) out of control’, though the ‘tremendous pressure’ 
the authorities in South Africa were facing was acknowledged, ranging from 
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increasing air traffic to porous land borders. These pressures, the report argued, 
arose from ‘(p)eople (who had) become refugees by weather changes that affect 
agricultural production and political changes that affect human rights’ (sic, Ibid: 
12). 
 
The 1997 US report became the basis of a National Inter-departmental Policy 
called the ‘Collective Approach to Border Control’ (CABC) (NIDS 1997). The 
CABC represented a sharp turn away from a rights-based approach towards 
securitisation that had been strongly advocated by South African and 
international migration scholars as well as South African human rights 
advocates, contained in a 1997 Green Paper on International Migration 
(Handmaker 1999: 299). The CABC policy became the core document regulating 
the co-ordination of border control between the four South African agencies 
responsible for immigration and border control: South African Defence Force 
(Military), Revenue Service (Customs), Police Service and Home Affairs, with 
Home Affairs as de facto the lead agency. Additional role players in the National 
Inter-departmental Structure (NIDS) with complementary functions included: 
the National Intelligence Agency, South African Secret Service and the 
Departments of Trade and Industry, Health, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, 
Environmental Affairs & Tourism, Correctional Service, Transport, Public 
Works, Justice and Welfare. 
  
According to Piet Grobler, then Provincial Commander (Western Cape) in the 
Border Police section of the South African Police Services, and a former 
member of the NIDS, the CABC sought to get beyond a previously disjointed 
approach and create a border control command structure that was both unified 
and accountable (Grobler 2001). The CABC addressed the various aims and 
functions of various levels of border control officials, from the national level to 
the port of entry level (NIDS 1997: 10-11). It recommended a phased 
programme of action, planned to take place over a one-and-a-half-year period, 
from mid-1997 until the end of 1998, in order to bring the three main agencies 
(Customs, Immigration and Police) ‘under one roof’, allocating existing staff to 
new positions and assigning new roles rather than hiring additional staff (Ibid: 
15). 
 
The Report was to be followed by a ‘Business Plan’, to be drawn up by an Inter-
Agency Structure. It was communicated in 1997 to Handmaker by a well-placed 
source that requested to be anonymous that there were also other proposals 
submitted to the NIDS Task Team for consideration, though not made publicly 
available, including: 
 
• a National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ICOC) Report to the 
Cabinet committee on Safety and Intelligence (CCSI). 
• the Customs Law Enforcement Task Group (CLETG) document for 
the Executive Head for SA Revenue Services’ and  
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• a draft document prepared by Mr I Lambinon (the Director-General) 
for the Department of Home Affairs.  
 
However, it became clear that the US-styled NIDS report was the most 
influential, despite the fact that its rigid approach to border control did not 
adequately take into account human rights ramifications. In particular, as 
discussed in the next sub-section, an especially pressing issue of human rights 
concern became the detention and deportation of migrants, including asylum 
seekers, refugees and even South Africans. 
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5   Detention and deportation 
Particularly under the Aliens Control Act, but also incorporated into subsequent 
legislative provisions, such as the Immigration Act (2002), it has been, 
administratively-speaking, a straightforward measure to detain and deport any 
suspected undocumented migrant. This sweeping power to detain and deport 
has also swept up South Africans deemed to be too black. For a great many years 
in the post-1994 democratic period, suspected persons were sent to Lindela 
Repatriation Centre, a privately-run holding centre in Gauteng Province in 
which government officials held financial interests, prior to their deportation 
(SAHRC 1999). Asylum seekers who entered the country without 
documentation were often detained pending a decision on their asylum 
application, even though the stated policy of the department was not to hold 
such persons if it appeared that the application would take ‘unreasonably long 
to process’ (Handmaker 1999: 295). 
 
It was only after 1995 Amendments were made to the Aliens Control Act that 
detention could be even reviewed by a judge, initially in terms of section 55 of 
the Aliens Control Act, a provision specifically provided for in respect of asylum 
seekers in terms of section 29 of the Refugees Act. However, in practice such 
reviews rarely took place (SAHRC 1999: 14). 
 
Eventually, according to the Immigration Act (2002), the DHA gained the power 
‘to apprehend’ detain and deport any ‘illegal foreigner’, regarded as a non-South 
African citizen who was in South Africa in contravention of the Immigration 
Act and included a prohibited person (IA, 2002: section 3(1)(g). The IA (2002: 
section 29) set out the categories of prohibited persons, which included: those 
carrying infectious or communicable diseases, persons wanted for the 
commission of serious crimes such as genocide, terrorism and other enumerated 
in the section, anyone previously deported and not rehabilitated, a member of a 
group advocating for racial hatred, or utilising crime and terrorism, and anyone 
found with a fraudulent visa, passport permit or identification document.  
 
Mfubu (2018: 182) has argued that in terms of this legislation, a person became 
prohibited by ‘operation of law’ and not by an ‘administrative act’. In other 
words, the latter action preserved for Minister and Director-General to declare 
persons as undesirable became a legal assumption rather than an arbitrary 
measure. Accordingly, a person could be declared ‘undesirable if they (we)re 
likely to become a public charge, are identified as such by the Minister, have 
been judicially declared incompetent, have been ordered to depart in terms of 
the Act, are a fugitive from justice, they have a previous criminal conviction 
without the option of a fine, or have overstayed the prescribed number of times’ 
(IA 2002: section 30(1)). Moreover, prohibited person status would normally 
pre-empt one’s entry or admission into South Africa (Mfubu 2018: 183), while a 
declaration of undesirability disqualified one from being granted a visa, entry, or 
admission into South Africa (Mfubu 2018: 185). In any event, either category of 
person could be subject to detention and deportation. Some measures in the IA 
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were even more rigid than before. For example, ignoring earlier Amendments to 
the Aliens Control Act that allowed one to request that his or her detention be 
confirmed by the court upon apprehension furthermore, under the IA 2002, a 
detained foreigner could be detained for 30 days without recourse to court. The 
Constitutional Court eventually held these provisions to be unconstitutional and 
ordered an amendment in compliance therewith (LHR 2016). 
 
Detentions and deportations of those deemed ‘illegal foreigners’ or 
‘undocumented persons’ in South Africa have raised serious concerns among 
scholars and a highly-visible campaign against deportations by human rights 
activists, with one scholar referring to South Africa as a ‘prolific deporter’ 
(Vigneswaran 2019: 8). After 2013, the number of deportations went down, 
following a so-called Special Dispensation for Zimbabweans (WPIM 2017: 30, 
Van Lennep 2019a). According to the DHA (2019), deportations had peaked at 
113,079 in 2013, while 24,266 deportations took place during the 2018-19 
reporting cycle. According to Amit (2012b: 27-39), the DHA has been violating 
both the Immigration Act and the 1996 Constitution by detaining persons 
beyond the acceptable 48 hours before they could ascertain their immigration 
status and detaining persons that are protected under the Refugees’ Act. In an 
open letter to the President of the Republic on World Refugee Day 2018, 
Lawyers for Human Rights summed up the situation thus: 
… it appears that the immigration system does not now operate as it should. It has 
come to the attention of the public that people are wrongfully and unlawfully 
detained under the current immigration legislation; that the process of arrest and 
detention of would-be immigrants is arbitrary and, therefore, violates the rights of 
citizens and other residents; that corruption and bribery are rife; that those 
detained in cells in South Africa’s main awaiting-repatriation detention facility are 
often subjected to inhumane treatment and indignity; [i]f the composition of the 
population at the Lindela repatriation facility is anything to go by, it would suggest 
that only people of African origin are arrested and deported as illegal aliens… 
(LHR 2018). 
These findings remained of concern in 2020, including a notably ‘high frequency 
in the detention of minors’ (LHR 2020: 11, 31). Despite a number of court 
actions challenging the DHA’s detention practices, there has been little change 
and indeed blatant disregard on the part of the DHA in relation to court orders 
against it (Landau and Amit 2014: 539). A similar situation has plagued other 
forms of South Africa’s migration regime, including permanent residence. While 
most migrants’ very presence in the country is very precarious, rendering them 
constantly subject to arrest, detention and deportation, in the next section we 
turn to the other end of the policy spectrum, in which South Africa’s 




6   Access to permanent residence and citizenship 
As observed earlier, it was well established by the late 1990s that the type of 
migration to South Africa was predominantly circular in nature; as Crush stated, 
‘very few migrants have any intention or wish to settle permanently in South 
Africa’ (Crush 1999: 128). Nevertheless, for persons who had been resident in 
South Africa for decades and whose children may have been born and grown up 
in South Africa, there was a need for a more robust, and certainly less ad hoc / 
discretionary policy on access to permanent residence. 
 
Once the ‘exclusive domain’ of certain white immigrants to South Africa, 
permanent residence has gradually broadened to larger groups of people. By the 
late 1990s, there were three main formal routes for obtaining permanent 
residence, namely the ‘amnesty’ programmes that regularised the status of 
former miners, SADC citizens and former Mozambican refugees as discussed 
earlier.  
 
Apart from amnesty, the second formal route was through an application to the 
Department of Home Affairs, normally following a period of 5 years temporary 
residence in the Republic and the lack of a criminal record. Alternatively, one 
could apply for permanent residence on the basis of 5-years residence and 
marriage to a South African citizen or (after 1999), ‘same-sex life partner’ 
relationship with a South African citizen. The latter provision was the outcome 
of the case National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (and others) v. 
Minister of Home Affairs (and others) (CCT 10/99), decided by the 
Constitutional Court on 2 December 1999. Attempts to introduce an exorbitant 
fee to spouses of South African partners were struck down by the courts as 
unconstitutional following the Dawood (and another) v. Minister of Home 
Affairs (and others), (CCT 35/99), which was decided on 7 June 2000. 
 
The third route for obtaining permanent residence came about through the 
Refugees Act in 1998, although not enforced until Regulations came into effect 
in 2002. Section 27(c) of the Refugees Act provided that a refugee: 
is entitled to apply for an immigration permit in terms of the Aliens Control Act, 
1991, after five years’ continuous residence in the Republic from the date on which 
he or she was granted asylum, if the Standing Committee certifies that he or she 
will remain a refugee indefinitely. 
Consistent with its reluctance to grant refugee status in the first place, the 
government has shown itself to be highly reluctant to extend permanent 
residence to refugees; and hence refugee status in South Africa had, with few 
exceptions, generally been granted as a temporary, renewable measure 
(Handmaker 1999: 299). Fifteen years later, the Department reported that 
between 2014 and 2016, it had issued a total of 46,100 permanent residence 
permits (PRPs) with the highest percentage being issued to spouses (35%), 
workers (18%) and persons with extraordinary skills (9%) (WPIM 2017: 27).  
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A mere 1,929 PRPs were issued to refugees, constituting 4% of the total issued 
(WPIM 2017: 27).  
 
As of 2020, the immigration regime made acquisition of permanent residence 
even more arduous, particularly for refugees. Applications for PRPs had to be 
submitted through the Visa Facilitation Service (VFS), which handled all 
immigration-related applications on behalf of the DHA. Once the VFS verified 
that all application documents were in order, it was expected to forward them to 
the DHA to process. It is at this point that applications usually tended to get 
stuck. This inaction by the DHA prompted court action. For instance, in the 
case of The Director General of the Department of Home Affairs & others v 
De Saude Attorneys & another, (1211/2017) [2019] ZASCA 46 (29 March 2019), 
the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of a lower court and ordered 
the DHA to determine and deliver decisions on some 473 cases that were the 
subject of the case, of these 94 were applications for permanent residence. The 
Court strongly criticised the DHA’s behaviour describing it as ‘unconscionable’, 
‘disgraceful’, and ‘sloth on a grand scale’. And yet, like many court orders in 
relation to detention, the government has been slow to implement, if it 
implements these court orders at all. 
 
For refugees, according to the Refugees Act (section 27) they are eligible for 
applying for permanent residence only after the Standing Committee for 
Refugee Affairs has certified that they ‘shall remain a refugee indefinitely’. They 
can only be eligible if they have held refugee status for ten years (it was previously 
five years changed under the RAA 2017). In Nalule’s interactions with refugees 
in South Africa in November 2019, four refugees anecdotally informed her that 
they were still awaiting to hear back from the Standing Committee for Refugee 
Affairs, more than two years after they had applied for certification. One had 
applied for permanent process and was yet to receive any response from the 
DHA more than five years later. 
 
Faced with all of these challenges as outlined in sections 2-6, South Africa’s 
problematic policy environment cried out for reform, which as discussed in the 
next section initially gained traction in the mid-1990s in relation to the 
government’s policy on refugees. Once again, US government influence 
continued when INS officials were represented on a policy “Task Team” that 
produced a White Paper on International Migration, released for public 
comment on May 1999, followed by internal discussions around subsequent, 
Draft Immigration Bills. In other words, the Immigration Bill / Act superseded 




7   Policy reforms from the late 1990s – 2018 
By the late 1990s, the pressure from scholars and NGOs to reform South 
Africa’s migration and border control regime reached boiling point. As discussed 
earlier, the country managed to pass a Refugees Act in 1998, thus carving out 
the promise of a new open and welcoming regime from an otherwise repressive 
and control-oriented regime. But, setting aside the lack of commitment to this 
promise of a new regime, the remainder of South Africa’s migration and border 
control regime was mostly unchanged.  
 
Two principal factors led to the first wave of policy reform in the late 1990s that 
continued in various phases until 2018. The first was a lack of formal regulation 
in 1994, with the exception of rudimentary asylum procedures that had been 
negotiated with UNHCR in the early 1990s to facilitate a voluntary repatriation 
of several hundred thousand, former Mozambican refugees from the civil war 
who had never been formally admitted to South Africa. The second were 
growing (perceived) pressures on the migration and asylum system following 
democratic elections in 1994. 
7.1 Limited formal regulation 
Despite the multiple agencies mandated to administer border control in the late 
1990s, there was very limited actual regulation by South Africa of its borders 
with neighbouring countries at the time of democratic elections in 1994. With 
regard to the second of the ‘two-gates’ referred to earlier, South Africa’s 
approach to spontaneous arrivals of migrants was essentially one of zero-
tolerance, whereby they would be treated as prohibited persons, accompanied 
by a range of nebulous exceptions that were mostly at the discretion of 
immigration officials. Moreover, none of these decisions were externally 
reviewable due to so-called ouster clauses that prevented judicial review of a 
decision taken under the Aliens Control Act. 
 
Those entering without documentation, or whose temporary documentation had 
been revoked for contravening a condition (for example, staying beyond the 
period designated in the permit without applying for a renewal) were by default 
designated under the Aliens Control Act as prohibited persons. The Act did 
provide for temporary entry of persons for a variety of conditions, primarily: 
work, business, tourism, study, and medical reasons. The Act also provided the 
possibility of one applying for permanent residence. But all of this was done on 
a discretionary basis. The advantage of such discretion is that it was utilised in 
the immediate post-apartheid years on a large scale to regularise the status of 
long-term undocumented persons in two separate programmes of amnesty, the 
first aimed at miners who had lived and worked in South Africa for at least five 
years, the second extended more generally to persons from SADC countries who 
had been employed for the last five years (Crush and Williams 1999; Handmaker 
2009). Later, it also became possible for former Mozambican refugees to 
regularise their prohibited person status, although this particular programme of 
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implementation was fraught with a profound lack of due process and 
accountability (Handmaker and Schneider 2002); Handmaker 2009: 121-149). In 
addition, giving effect to Basic Agreements signed between the South African 
government and UNHCR in 1991, persons who had applied for refugee status 
received a ‘section 41’ permit, prior to the coming into force of the Refugees 
Act 1998 in April 2000 (Handmaker 1999: 296). 
 
As Crush (1999) argued, the deeply racialised nature of this policy meant that 
things had not moved on very much since the days of apartheid. In practice, this 
meant that for those who spontaneously presented themselves at the border 
during this period had little formal guarantee that they would be allowed in, 
although already corruption was endemic, and many people who could afford a 
bribe did get through (Peberdy and Crush 2001). Further, as was indeed the case 
prior to 1994, the majority of migrants post-1994 bypassed the border post 
altogether. The control of South Africa’s lengthy and porous borders was largely 
managed by an electric border fence had been constructed in the 1980s at the 
border with Mozambique by the South African apartheid regime, ostensibly to 
deter militant groups (Kotzé and Hill: 20). The fence, known vernacularly as the 
snake had two modes – detect and lethal – and required a cabinet decision to 
switch to lethal mode (Ibid; HRW 1998: 67). 
 
Those who did manage to cross the border and enter South Africa in an 
unregulated manner, whether through a border post, or through a gap in the 
fence, particularly from Mozambique and Zimbabwe, were generally confronted 
with a hostile reception (Seda 2015: 62). This included Francisco Chiure from 
Mozambique, who declared on 16 March 1996: ‘(t)hey just say: “Go, you brought 
nothing with you.” The people who come back are often killed at the border. 
We are killed trying to get to our families after we are sent back here alone’ 
(Johnstone and Simbine, 1998: 170). While typical of the realities of migration 
globally, and the desperation of those who would do anything to cross the 
border for a perceived improvement of their lives, such experiences, which post-
1994 scholars began paying increasing attention to, shattered the idealistic vision 
that many migrants had of South Africa when it became a liberal democracy.  
 
Post-1994 migration to South Africa has been attributed to various factors, 
including the demise of apartheid in South Africa and end to a decades-long civil 
war in Mozambique (Seda 2015: 47-49). However, this perceived increase did 
not take into account the hundreds of thousands of Mozambican refugees who 
fled the civil war for South Africa, some of whom were later repatriated with 
assistance from UNHCR (Dolan 1998), others who later applied for 
regularisation of their status (Handmaker 2009: 124).  
 
In any event, by the late 1990s, there was a growing perception amongst 
policymakers, politicians and the general public that South Africa was being 
inundated with migrants perceived to be undesirable. In particular, economic 
immigrants who, in an effort to regularize their status, were perceived to be 
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overwhelming the country’s otherwise liberal asylum system (which was the only 
part of the DHA’s cumbersome migration and border control regime that 
systematically began to gather statistics from the mid-1990s). 
 
As with any perception, there is frequently a kernel of truth to it. As the next 
sub-section shows, with the exception of Mozambique in the 1980s and 
Zimbabwe in the late 2000s, and based on rudimentary statistics available from 
the mid-1990s, the principal pressures on the asylum system have been broadly 
confirmed as coming from a small handful of countries, though nowhere near 
the millions of migrants that Minaar and Hough reported in 1996 as part of their 
ominous-sounding book Who Goes There?. 
7.2 Growing pressures on the asylum system 
Statistics on migration should always be regarded with some scepticism and 
South Africa hardly an exception to this (Danso and McDonald 2001: 124). This 
is particularly the case when there is a high level of conflation between refugees 
and other legal-conceptual categories of migrants. Since democratic elections in 
1994, the South African government recorded a statistical increase of asylum 
seekers from particular countries. At the same time, the majority of migrants 
arriving in South Africa came from neighbouring countries, although it was not 
widely understood, let alone acknowledged, that these migration flows were 
mostly adopting a circular pattern (Crush 1999). Few migrants from 
neighbouring countries applied for political asylum; hence, the real pressures on 
the asylum system, with the exception of Mozambicans who had fled to South 
Africa during the 1980s, came from elsewhere, as confirmed by statistics by the 
South African Department of Home Affairs that they began to systematically 
gather from the late 1990s. 
 
In 1999, out of a total of around 22,000 applicants for political asylum, more 
than a third (34%) were from three countries that would have been broadly-
regarded at the time as presenting a valid claim for refugee status, namely: 
Somalia, Zaire and Angola (DHA 1999). These statistics also revealed very large 
numbers of applicants (21%) from Nigeria, India and Pakistan, about which 
there was general scepticism, reinforced by the UNHCR that was increasing its 
presence in South Africa, about the validity of these claims. This is not to say 
that there was no possibility of one successfully lodging a claim from these 
countries, but the starting assumption on the part of the Department of Home 
Affairs, which UNHCR, IOM and others reinforced, was that they should not 
be regarded as refugees. 
 
The already dubious gathering of statistics worsened by the 2000s, whereby the 
only statistics that were available were cumulative (i.e. gathered over a period of 
several years), and which only highlighted countries in respect of which there 
was reason to believe persons had a valid claim (DHA 2005). To be sure, this 
was a period in which the UNHCR was funding a substantial backlog of 
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applications (Handmaker 2008). Despite UNHCR’s considerable investment in 
attempting to reduce the backlog, their efforts didn’t appear to improve the 
situation very much and by 2015, the backlog in asylum applications had 
reportedly reached nearly a million (Masuku 2020). 
 
By 2009, statistics on asylum applications that were reported by UNHCR (2010), 
based on data from the DHA, appeared to improve, or at least became more 
transparent. This not only revealed a peak of around 220,000 applications, ten 
times more than a decade earlier, but a more detailed breakdown of applicants 
confirmed earlier statistical trends (in relation to particular countries). But there 
were some notable differences as well. By the late 2000s, Zimbabweans fleeing 
widespread civil disorder accounted for the single largest group of migrants post-
1994. However, unlike the Mozambicans of the 1980s who had also arrived in 
large numbers as Convention refugees, but were never recognised as such, these 
Zimbabweans could apply for refugee status. This was confirmed by official 
statistics in 2009; those applying for asylum were overwhelmingly from 
Zimbabwe (67%), followed by Malawi (7.1%), Ethiopia (4.8%), DRC (2.8%), 
Bangladesh (2.2%); India (1.6%) and Somalia (1.6%). 
 
The reliability of statistics appears to have improved further in the 2010s, and 
again confirmed some general statistical trends established at the end of the 
1990s, with the exception of asylum applicants from Zimbabwe. According to 
STATS-SA (2015b), the majority of asylum seekers still appeared to come from 
Zimbabwe, although fewer than before (17,785), followed by Ethiopia (9,332); 
Nigeria (6,554); DRC (6,355); Bangladesh (3,331); Pakistan (2,596); Malawi 
(2,372); Somalia (2,079); India (2,064); Ghana (1,778). 
 
While statistics and migration trends can be readily challenged, and often have 
been in the large volume of research conducted on South African migration, 
albeit of varying quality, the elusive vision of South Africa being a welcoming 
country of refuge and opportunity undeniably became constrained. Indeed, in 
reforming the country’s antiquated migration and border control policies, the 
post-1994 government was torn from, on the one hand, between its domestic 
and international human rights obligations and, on the other, with growing 
pressure to address a perceived immigrant problem. 
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8   Three phases of  migration policy reform 
Rudimentary attempts to overhaul South Africa’s migration policies and bring 
the Aliens Control Act more in line with the country’s new constitution began 
tentatively in 1995, with the Aliens Control Amendment Act. However, these 
still fell far short of constitutional expectations (Klaaren 1998). More substantial 
reforms, which started in the mid-1990s, eventually took place in three phases: 
the first was the 2001 Immigration Bill, the second was from 2004 until 2010 
and the third from 2017 until 2020. 
8.1 First phase of reform: 2001 White Paper and Bill 
Beginning with a process that started in the mid-1990s, which has been referred 
to earlier, by 2001, the South African government issued a Migration White 
Paper and Immigration Bill, which urged greater involvement of the community 
in border control: 
In this White Paper administrative and policy emphasis is shifted from border 
control to community and workplace inspection with the participation of 
communities and the cooperation of other branches and spheres of government… 
an interdepartmental committee will be established to coordinate law enforcement 
and community action (WPIM, 1997: Executive Summary). 
This approach seemed to be motivated by a belief that the community not only 
had a ‘vested interest’ (see below) but was in fact responsible for contributing to 
border control efforts, in the same way that they are responsible for reporting 
crime.  
it is possible to promote a different management of migration issues which makes 
a community responsible for cooperating with internal policing actions to ensure 
that illegal immigrants are not attracted to South Africa (WPIM, 1999: section 
4.4.1). 
In other words, the approach of the South African government attributed 
violations of the country’s immigration laws as quasi-criminal acts, allowing for 
a broad scope for arrest and detention, which a decade later scholars began 
referring to as crimmigration (Stumpf 2006; Hernández 2015). 
 
Finally, while the policy documents continued to stress reliance on ‘the 
community’ to assist in detecting undocumented migrants, there was tacit 
recognition of the danger that such an approach would lead to an increase in 
xenophobia: 
The (Immigration Service) should enforce immigration laws within each 
community and cooperate with police structures and community interests to 
ensure that illegal aliens are not harboured within the community and that the 
community does not perpetrate crimes against aliens or display xenophobic 




Moreover, emulating approaches in Europe and North America (Mudde 2010), 
this approach also drew on nativist sentiment. 
Theoretically, the migration policy could choose to shape the future composition 
of the South African population by giving preference to certain types of individuals 
who are deemed to be more desirable as members of our national community than 
others (WPIM, 1999: section 7.1). 
This notwithstanding, as explained earlier, the reasons for such widespread 
xenophobic harassment, discrimination and violence were arguably more 
complex than that (Landau 2010). However, such an approach had strong 
resonance with the recommendations of the INS, based on experiences in the 
USA that the community was a crucial component in enforcing migration 
control. Eventually, this ad hoc approach formally gave way to the Immigration 
Act 2002, which came into force by way of implementing Regulations 
(Immigration Regulations, 2004).  
 
As already mentioned, the Immigration Act 2002 (IA) was not a radical departure 
from the ACA, and in some respects (such as the ability to review one’s 
detention) it was even harsher, although it did contain some more progressive 
provisions, the inclusion and shaping of which have been attributed to civil 
society input (Klaaren 2018: 33). This resulted in some of the IA’s key stated 
objectives to establish a new system of immigration control, ‘performed within 
the highest applicable standards of human rights protection’. In tension with 
this, the IA sought to ensure that ‘security considerations were fully satisfied’, 
that ‘border monitoring is strengthened and illegal immigration through them is 
detected, reduced and deterred’ and that ‘immigration laws are effectively and 
efficiently enforced thereby reducing the pull factors of illegal immigration’ (IA: 
Preamble).  
 
One of the linkages that had been associated with the ACA, was its ‘national 
rather than a provincial framing of migration regulation’ (Klaaren 2018: 33) and 
therefore only slightly departed from the strategy expressed in the WPIM, 1999. 
For instance, the Act established an Immigration Advisory Board composed of 
representatives of various government departments (Trade and Industry, 
Labour, Tourism, Finance, Safety and Security, South African Revenue Services, 
Education, Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Home Affairs); civil society 
representatives, and specific experts appointed by the Minister (IA, section 4). 
Provincial or municipal governments did not have any representation on this 
Board. The IA also established a temporary permit system that aimed at 
attracting financially self-sufficient persons or those with skills so much needed 
on the South African labour market (IA, sections 10, 19-21). Eligibility for 
permanent residency was dependent upon assurance of employment and having 
lived in South Africa for a period of five years. Under the Act, a foreigner would 
be considered an ‘undesirable person’, should they become or be likely to 
become a ‘public charge’ (IA, section 30). The Act further prohibited rendering 
assistance to an ‘illegal foreigner’, and as such employers, learning institutions 
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and property owners were obliged to ensure the legality of one’s status lest they 
face penalties (IA, sections 38-42, 49). 
 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, another wave of migration reform came soon 
afterwards in 2004, with Amendments to the IA. 
8.2 Second phase of reforms: 2004-2010 
In 2004, less than a year after the 2002 Immigration Act came into force, there 
was a second phase of policy reform. The stated objectives of the 2002 
Immigration Act were expanded in 2004 to include the promotion of a human 
rights-based culture of enforcement. Ostensibly, this objective aimed at ensuring 
that South Africa complied with international obligations and that civil society 
would be educated on the rights of foreigners and refugees (Immigration 
Amendment Act (IAA) 2004, Preamble). Another change was to invest more 
powers in the Minister to make regulations relating to, inter alia, the powers and 
duties of immigration officers, steps to be taken to prevent the illegal entry of 
foreigners into South Africa and how these could be traced, identified and 
removed; furthermore, regulations were introduced pertaining to processes and 
procedures for persons entering or desiring to enter into South Africa (IAA 
2004, section 7). The Amendment Act also introduced a 14-day asylum transit 
permit to be issued to any person claiming asylum at a port of entry. Within 14 
days, a prospective asylum seeker was expected to apply for asylum, failing which 
he or she would be deemed an ‘illegal foreigner and be dealt with in accordance 
with this Act’ (IAA 2004, section 23). In other words, an asylum seeker would 
from that point onwards no longer be dealt with under the Refugees Act, but 
could face deportation if they failed to obtain an asylum seeker permit before 
the expiry of the 14 days. 
 
Another Immigration Amendment Act 2007 (IAA 2007) was less far-reaching 
and largely clarified or made ‘technical corrections’ to a number of provisions. 
A third Immigration Amendment Act 2011 (IAA 2011) made more substantive 
changes. For present purposes, we shall only point out the amendment regarding 
asylum transit visas and cross-border passes. The Act reduced the validity period 
of the asylum transit permits, which were renamed ‘visas’, from 14 days to five 
days (IAA, 2011, section 23). Additionally, the Act repealed the provision on 
cross border permits that previously the DHA could issue to citizens or residents 
of countries sharing border with South Africa (IAA 2011, section 16). The latter 
repeal is significant as it happened years after South Africa had signalled its 
commitment to regional free movement on free movement of persons, when it 
signed a Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (SADC 2005). 
Yet, at the time of writing, the Protocol had yet to come into force as it had not 
yet attained the minimum required number of ratifications. In the interim, South 
Africa still maintains bilateral agreements with individual SADC governments, 




The bilateral approach to regularising immigration status of SADC citizens was 
most visible in relation to Zimbabwean, Angolan and Lesotho nationals who 
were resident in South Africa. Under the Immigration Act (section 31(2b)), the 
Minister of Home Affairs may ‘grant a category of foreigners the rights of 
permanent residence for a specified or unspecified period when special 
circumstances exist which would justify such a decision’. Accordingly, in May 
2010, the government of South Africa launched the Documentation of the 
Zimbabweans Project (DZP) with the twin aims of regularising undocumented 
Zimbabweans residing in South Africa and relieving the pressure on the asylum 
system. Successful applicants were issued with either a study permit, work permit 
or business permit valid for four years (PMG 2011).  
 
Since the expiry of the DZP (referred to earlier) in 2014, the South African 
government twice extended the dispensation for Zimbabweans (Moyo 2018), 
with the latest extension due to expire in December 2021 (DHA 2017). 
Meanwhile, the Angolans were offered a dispensation after the cessation of their 
refugee status was announced in 2013 (DHA 2013). This had long been an issue 
of concern (Handmaker and Ndessomin 2008). For those Angolans that could 
not return to their home country, the South African government offered them 
the opportunity to apply for a two-year Angolan cessation permit which, upon 
expiry, was then converted to a four-year Angolan Special Permit that took effect 
in 2017 and was due to expire in 2021 (Scalabrini Centre 2017).  
 
Finally, a dispensation for the Lesotho nationals, just like for the Zimbabweans, 
was more or less an amnesty, intended to enable those that might be residing 
illegally or had acquired residence permits irregularly to regularise their status 
(DHA 2016). At the time of writing, the Lesotho nationals’ dispensation was on 
its second reiteration, to expire in December 2023 (DHA 2019).  
 
But again, these policy reforms came under fierce scrutiny, in Parliament and in 
the Courts, and led to a third phase of reforms beginning in 2017.  
8.3 Third phase of reforms: 2017-2020 
Immigration reforms of the late 2010s have taken more grounded forms, with 
the adoption of a Green Paper on International Migration (GPIA 2016) that was 
quickly followed by a proposed White Paper on International Migration, 2017 
(WPIM 2017), including a proposed Border Management Authority, Refugees 
Amendment Act 2017 and other miscellaneous measures. 
White Paper on International Migration 2017 
The WPIM was noted for its security-minded overtones (Khan, Louw and 
Ncumisa 2018: 87). But even so, the WPIM recognised the need to position 
South Africa’s migration policy within the African development agenda (WPIM 
2017: 15, 32). Still, the dominant emphasis was on security; the WPIM asserted 
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that South Africa had ‘become an attractive destination for irregular migrants 
(undocumented migrants, border jumpers, over-stayers, smuggled and trafficked 
persons) who pose a security threat to the economic stability and sovereignty of 
the country’ (WPIM 2017: 35).  
 
The DHA reported that majority of the irregular migrants, based on deportation 
statistics between 2012 and 2016, were from neighbouring countries, i.e. 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho (WPIM 2017: 29). Part of the problem 
was attributed to a fragmented border management approach which 
‘compromised the integrity of … the long and porous land and maritime 
borders’ (WPIM 2017, 35). Accordingly, the WPIM proposed a new approach 
that entailed the establishment of the Border Management Authority that would 
take over the management of South Africa’s 72 designated ports of entry. Three 
aspects are worth noting in particular that specifically targeted asylum seekers 
and refugees, notably the proposed establishment of Asylum Processing Centres 
(APCs) closer to South Africa’s northern land borders and two other, related 
measures that – respectively – proposed removal of asylum seekers’ right to 
work and study and restricted access to permanent residence by recognised 
refugees. 
 
Seemingly inspired by European-style centres, the idea of the APCs was that all 
asylum claims would be processed before an asylum seeker can relocated to any 
other place in South Africa (WPIM 2017: 61). This move rekindled concerns 
dating back to earlier proposals, which would have greatly curtailed the freedom 
of movement and residence hitherto enjoyed by asylum seekers and face similar 
capacity and humanitarian problems as the notorious Lindela Detention Centre 
(Landau 2008: 40-42; Jenkins and De la Hunt 2008). To make matters worse, 
this proposed move to curtail movement and residence was exacerbated by at 
least four other institutional developments and proposed policy measures, all of 
which threatened to erase the hard-won rights that asylum seekers and refugees 
had gained with the passing of the Refugees Act 1998 and multiple cases brought 
by NGOs and others by way of public interest litigation (Handmaker 2011). At 
the time of writing, the APCs had yet to be implemented. 
 
Public interest litigation on behalf of migrants and refugees, which is another 
paper altogether, has a longer history in South Africa, particularly from the mid-
1990s (Abel 1995; Handmaker 1999, 2001, 2009, 2011). However, from 2011, 
lawyers systematically brought several cases once refugee reception officers were 
closed at locations in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. These 
closures appeared to anticipate the introduction of the APCs, but ended up 
forcing asylum seekers and refugees to apply for refugee status and/or visa 
extensions at the remaining offices in Pretoria, Limpopo and Durban. For many 
asylum seekers, these offices were hundreds of kilometres from their place of 
residence (Khan and Lee 2018, 1212-3). While these cases challenging the 
closure of the Cape Town and Port Elizabeth offices were often successful, 
thanks to the tenacious efforts of public interest lawyers and NGOs, at the time 
of writing, the DHA had yet to re-open the Cape Town office, while the Port 
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Elizabeth office, although re-opened was not yet providing all required services 
(Khan and Lee 2018, 1213-4). 
 
The WPIM proposed the removal of the automatic right to work and study for 
asylum seekers (WPIM 2017: 61). This critical, hard-won right was the outcome 
of persistent lobbying, and ultimately litigation by NGOs in the lead up to the 
Refugees Act 1998 and accompanying Regulations in 2002 (Handmaker 2011: 
77-79). Part of the justification for the roll back was that an applicant would be 
catered for in the APCs whereby all their basic needs would be provided while 
their application is being processed (WPIM 2017: 61). This policy statement had 
been given legal effect by the Refugees Amendment Act, 2017 which came into 
force in January 2020 (RAA 2017). Hence, at the time of writing, the law 
stipulated that the right to work may not be endorsed on the asylum seeker visa 
of an applicant who is able ‘to sustain himself or herself and their dependants’ 
for a period of at least four months’, or who is ‘offered shelter and basic 
necessities by UNHCR or other charitable organisation’ financially, they would 
have to do so without engaging in any economic activity in South Africa., or who 
fails to produce a letter of employment’ in attempt to extend their right to work 
(RAA 2017, section 22(8) as amended). 
 
A third measure was with regard to obtaining permanent residency. the White 
Paper proposed that ‘[r]efugees will no longer have access to South Africa’s 
permanent residency since the [permanent residence permit] is being replaced 
by a long-term residence visa’ (WPIM 2017, 61). The long-term residency visa 
that the White Paper proposed for all immigrants was a move aimed at delinking 
immigration from citizenship status (WPIM 2017, 42-43). Refugees would also 
be entitled to apply for a long-term residency if they had continuously lived in 
South Africa as a refugee for at least ten years (WPIM 2017, 43). Indeed, the 
practice had been (and it is not expected to change) that the period taken into 
account in this case is the time one has been formally recognised as a refugee 
and not the time spent as an asylum seeker in South Africa, which for some 
people dragged on for a decade or longer (Fassin et al 2017). 
  
A further measure proposed by the White paper was to extend the refugee 
exclusion clauses to include those asylum seekers who had failed to apply for 
asylum in third countries en route to South Africa (WPIM 2017, 62) While this 
proposition did not find its way into the amendments to the 1998 Refugees Act, 
other propositions, such as revocation of status of those who had returned to 
their countries and the regulations of strict conditions of travel for refugees 
(WPIM 2017, 62), have since morphed into law (Refugee Regulations 2019, 
regulation 4).  
 
As an apparent justification for these draconian measures, the WPIM asserted 
that the ‘asylum seeker regime was being abused by economic migrants resulting 
in over 90 per cent of the claims for asylum being rejected’ (WPIM 2017, 59). 
From this, it seemed very evident that the White Paper propositions on asylum 
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management aimed to deter a small number of so-called economic migrants 
who, based on dubious, and opaque statistics, were nevertheless regarded as 
abusing the system, notwithstanding the fact that motivations for applying for 
asylum were always very mixed.  
Refugees Amendment Act 2017 
The Refugees Amendment Act 2017 (RAA 2017), which came into force on I 
January 2020 (Refugee Regulations 2019, Commencement statement), made it 
mandatory for all asylum seekers to be in possession of an asylum transit visa, 
obtainable at a port of entry before they could apply for asylum. The visa was 
valid for five days at the expiry of which one may become an illegal migrant if 
they had not yet applied for asylum (RAA 2017, sections 4(1)h & 15(1)a). The 
challenges encountered by asylum seekers and refugees in accessing refugee 
reception centres have been well-documented and need not be repeated here 
(Amit 2012a, Amit 2015, Khan and Lee 2018). One thing that is clear though 
from this scholarship, is that even the 14 days that the law previously prescribed 
for an asylum seeker to apply for asylum proved to be impracticable, due mainly 
to bureaucratic and administrative barriers.  
 
An asylum seeker, upon application was issued with an asylum seeker visa that 
was renewable from time to time (RAA 2017, section 22). Accordingly, the 
asylum visa could be withdrawn for a number of reasons including rejection of 
one’s application or if one contravenes any of the conditions of the visa (RAA 
2017, section 22). According to the proposal, in the event of a visa withdrawal, 
an asylum seeker ‘shall’ be removed from South Africa (Refugee Regulations 
2019, regulation 13).  
 
The RAA further expanded the grounds upon which an asylum seeker could be 
excluded from refugee status, going beyond the classic grounds stipulated under 
international refugee law (Sivakumaran 2014). Conventionally, this provision 
provided for the exclusion of persons that had committed serious crimes, 
namely, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes against peace, serious 
non-political crimes, or has committed acts against the principles of either the 
United Nations or the African Union (UN Convention 1951, article 1F, OAU 
Convention 1969, article 1(5)). The RAA expanded upon these grounds to 
include a person who had entered South Africa other than at a designated port 
of entry and failed to provide compelling reasons for such entry, or a person 
who failed to apply for asylum within five days of entry into South Africa (RAA 
2017, section 4). 
 
At the time of writing, with the 2017 Refugee Law in force, the line between 
legality and illegality for both asylum seekers and refugees had become thinner. 
The timelines within which visas (formerly permits) have to be applied for have 
become shorter even as no significant changes have been made on the part of 
the bureaucracy to improve access to the asylum process or to the refugee 
reception centres. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the refugee reception offices 
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countrywide had been closed and even some of the existing ones do not offer 
all the services required by refugees. As Jonathan Crush and his colleagues 
cynically observed, the new Refugee Laws and policies effectively rendered 
South Africa ‘undesirable’ for asylum seekers and refugees (Crush et al 2017).  
Proposed Border Management Authority 2020 
The Border Management Authority that had been proposed in the White Paper 
(2017) stated as its rationale ‘to create an operational balance between security, 
trade facilitation, tourism promotion and socio-economic development both 
within South Africa and the SADC region. It was intended to provide for an 
integrated border control with officials having a common identity under a single 
command structure’ (WPIM 2017: 40). This proposal received legal backing with 
the passage of the Border Management Authority Act (BMAA 2020). 
 
The BMAA 2020 established the Border Management Authority (BMA) whose 
functions were: to ‘facilitate and manage the legitimate movement of persons 
within the border law enforcement area and at ports of entry’; to ‘facilitate and 
manage the legitimate movement of goods within the border law enforcement 
area and at ports of entry’; and ‘to co-operate and co-ordinate border law 
enforcement functions with other organs of state, border communities or any 
other persons’ (BMAA 2020, section 5). Hitherto, border management was 
coordinated by the Border Control Operational Coordinating Committee 
(BCOCC) which earlier on had been based within the South African Revenue 
Services (SARS), but in 2014 was relocated to the DHA. South Africa’s border 
management has been bedevilled with the fragmentation and overlap of official 
functions. It has been reported that: 
the borders are managed by 7 different departments applying 58 different laws 
passed by Parliament. The departments are Home Affairs (Immigration Division), 
SAPS, SANDF, Agriculture, Land and Rural Development, Health and SARS 
(Customs and Excise). These departments have seven different command 
structures with different laws, work ethics and mandates (van Lennep 2019b).  
It has also been reported, by the Democratic Alliance, one of the main political 
opposition parties to the ANC, with origins in the pre-1994 apartheid regime, 
that there were “approximately 18 government departments and entities that 
play some role in either border security or control” (DA 2018: 10). In other 
words, the institutional and bureaucratic struggles of the past have been 
persistent. 
 
Besides coordination of border management, the BMAA (2020) had mentioned 
in its Preamble that the integrated and coordinated border management is 
necessary, among others, to: 
ensure effective and efficient border law enforcement functions at ports of entry 
and the border: contribute to the facilitation of legitimate trade and secure travel; 
contribute to the prevention of smuggling and trafficking of human beings and 
goods; prevent illegal cross-border movement; contribute to the protection of the 
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Republic’s environmental and natural resources; and protect the Republic from 
harmful and infectious diseases, pests and substances. Its overarching aim though 
is securing South Africa’s borders and protecting national interest. It is also not 
clear under the Act whether provincial or municipal governments will have any 
role in its implementation. 
The BMAA had, at the time of writing, been enacted, though did not stipulate a 
specific commencement date. It provided that the ‘President may…determine 
different dates in respect of the commencement of different provisions of this 
Act’ (BMAA 2020, section 41(2)).  
 
As such, with still much contestation surrounding migration policies and border 
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